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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20040880-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State concedes that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801, the communications 
fraud statute, imposes criminal liability for harmless conduct and thereby provides 
virtually unlimited prosecutorial discretion. The State further argues that the object of the 
"fraud'' is irrelevant so long as a falsehood is made with knowingly, intentionally, or with 
a reckless disregard for the truth. 
However, harmless conduct is protected under the First Amendment. The mens 
rea element relied upon by the State is applicable to defamatory falsehoods. Defamation 
is conduct injurious to reputation and is, therefore, harmful. In contrast, all falsehoods 
are not harmful, and therefore, may not all be proscribed simply because they are made 
with at least a reckless disregard for the truth. Moreover, although some falsehoods are 
protected in order to protect speech that matters; §76-10-1801 proscribes all falsehoods. 
All content-based regulations, such as §76-10-1801, must take into account what 
is said as well as the circumstances in which it is said, which the communications fraud 
statute fails to do. In other words, harmless speech is protected under the First 
Amendment. Because the communications fraud statute requires no imminent harm or 
danger to impose criminal liability and indiscriminately prohibits both protected and 
unprotected conduct, the statute violates the First Amendment and is facially overbroad. 
In short, the statute is not narrowly drawn to further a compelling state interest. 
Further, the State has failed to address the case law cited in Mr. Norris' opening 
brief holding criminal content-based regulations to a different standard than that which 
applies to defamation. The State has also not addressed the fact that the communications 
fraud statute has no precedent in the common law or in other jurisdictions, as outlined in 
detail in Mr. Norris' opening brief, or the fact that in each and eveiy case, analogous 
statutes require proof of harm or intent to defraud of some measurable value. 
The State's argument that Mr. Norris has no standing to argue facial overbreadth 
is not preserved and is without merit. Under applicable precedent, Mr. Norris has 
standing to mount a facial overbreadth challenge, whether the communications at issue in 
this case are or are not protected under the First Amendment. His course of conduct was 
affected with a constitutional interest, proscribed by statute such thai there existed a threat 
of prosecution, and he clearly has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. 
Finally, a challenge that a statute is facially overbroad encompasses the void for 
2 
vagueness doctrine. Both doctrines are ultimately concerned with preventing unfettered 
prosecutorial discretion and leaving matters of basic policy in the hands of law 
enforcement and others. As such, both doctrines are logically related and similar. 
Therefore, Mr. Norris assumed that this Court's grant of certiorari on the issue of 
overbreadth included the void for vagueness doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BROAD LANGUAGE OF §76-10-1801 PROHIBITS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY, IS NOT READILY 
SUBJECT TO A NARROWING CONSTRUCTION, AND IS THUS 
FACIALLY INVALID. 
A. THE STATE'S RELIANCE ON MENS REA IS MISPLACED, AS 
§76-10-1801 IS A CONTENT-BASED REGULATION THAT 
PROSCRIBES COMMUNICATION IRRESPECTIVE OF 
WHETHER THERE IS ANY THREAT OF IMMINENT HARM, 
AND THEREBY VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
1. The State concedes §76-10-1801 proscribes harmless conduct. 
While conceding that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 allows the State broad 
discretion to prosecute even harmless conduct, the State attempts to justify this anomaly 
by urging the Court to adopt the novel position that the government can impose criminal 
liability for any falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth. BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-PETITIONER ("Br. Rspdt") at 9-13. "But 
the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." Schenck 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
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2. Harmless conduct is protected under the First Amendment 
Therefore, the State's argument is not correct. Even under the law relied upon 
by the State, a defamatory or libelous falsehood made with '"actual malice"' falls outside 
the protective scope of the First Amendment, not simply because it is false, but because it 
is harmful. New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "Speech is often 
provocative and challenging. . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or 
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious 
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." 
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 
(1949). 
Defamation is a harm that the government has a limited power to prevent and 
prosecute. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "[So] long as [states] do 
not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate 
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a 
private individual." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 499 (1975) (citation 
and quotation omitted) (emphasis added). In the context of a facial overbreadth 
challenge, the possibility that "some unprotected speech may go unpunished is 
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted . . . " Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., All U.S. 50, 60 (1976). 
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3. §76-10-1801 proscribes harmless conduct 
The communications fraud statute imposes liability without fault, because it does 
not require harm or injury, as the State concedes. Br. Rspdt at 13. Thus, the statute 
prohibits both protected and unprotected speech.1 In every case where courts have 
determined that a certain type of speech is not protected by the First Amendment, the 
ability of government to regulate content-based communication is still limited not by 
mens rea, but by the necessity of proving a cognizable harm that may result from its 
publication. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd, 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (holding that although the government has a compelling interest 
in ensuring criminals do not profit from their crimes, New York's "'Son of Sam" law was 
not narrowly tailored to achieve that end).2 This is true because historically, courts have 
exercised great caution in balancing purportedly compelling government interests against 
'"The question of whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment 
often depends on the content of the speech. Thus, the line between permissible advocacy 
and impermissible incitation to crime or violence depends, not merely on the setting in 
which the speech occurs, but also on exactly what the speaker had to say." Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., Ml U.S. at 66. 
2
"As a means of ensuring that victims are compensated from the proceeds of crime, 
the Son of Sam law is significantly overinclusive. As counsel for the Board conceded at 
oral argument, the statute applies to works on any subject, provided that they express the 
author's thoughts or recollections about his crime, however tangentially or incidentally. 
In addition, the statute's broad definition of "person convicted of a crime" enables the 
Board to escrow the income of any author who admits in his work to having committed a 
crime, whether or not the author was ever actually accused or convicted." Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. at 121 (citations 
omitted). 
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First Amendment rights relative to any content-based regulation of speech, which is the 
precise type of regulation the communications fraud statute is: 
wThere are a few legal categories in which content-based regulation has been 
permitted or at least contemplated. These include obscenity, see, e. g., Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), defamation, 
see, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., Ml U.S. 749, 86 
L. Ed. 2d 593, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985), incitement, see, e.g., Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430, 89 S. Ct. 1827 (1969), or situations 
presenting some grave and imminent danger the government has the power to 
prevent, see, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 75 L. Ed. 
1357,51 S.Ct. 625 (1931)." 
Id. at 127 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Harmless conduct is protected under the First 
Amendment because the government has no interest, compelling or otherwise, to prevent 
it; and as noted above, the possible harm that may result from some unprotected speech 
going unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech will be muted. 
4. A content-based regulation, such as §76-10-1801, must be 
narrowly drawn to prevent some harm that the government 
has the power to prevent 
Therefore, whether the government seeks to regulate defamatory speech, 
obscenity, or speech posing some grave and imminent danger, in each case the 
government must first demonstrate a compelling interest in preventing a specific type of 
harm. Accordingly and contrary to the State's arguments, it is inappropriate to apply a 
civil or criminal defamation standard to a criminal statute that is not aimed at proscribing 
harmful defamatory speech, which further explains why there is no legal precedent to 
support such a misapplication of the law. 
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As the United States Supreme Court further instructed, "The immediacy of a 
particular communication and the imminence of harm are factors that have made certain 
communications less protected than others. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971), with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)/' Ohralikv. 
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (emphasis added). As an initial matter 
and contrary to the State's interpretation of existing law, Ohralik illustrates that the First 
Amendment principles articulated in Schenck v. United States are not only still viable, but 
they form a strong foundation for First Amendment jurisprudence upon which later 
decisions are and will continue to be built. 
But even more compelling is the universal requirement that the government 
justify any content-based regulation by demonstrating the reality of some harm it has the 
power to prevent, or in other words, a compelling interest. Id. Yet §76-10-1801 deviates 
from the principles governing First Amendment jurisprudence in that it imposes criminal 
liability regardless of whether the conduct proscribed may result in any harm, imminent or 
otherwise. The State acknowledges this fact, but asserts that as long as a false 
communication is made with the requisite intent, the object of the deceit and the admitted 
absence of harm is irrelevant. Br. Rspdt. at 13. The State's position is wrong, as the law 
cited herein demonstrates. Further, the State can demonstrate no compelling interest in 
preventing and prosecuting harmless falsehoods. 
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5. §76-10-1801 is not narrowly drawn to further a compelling 
government interest 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is nox narrowly aimed at proscribing 
obscenity, defamation, incitement, or even situations involving grave and imminent 
danger, although the statute is so broad, all such categories of speech could conceivably 
be suppressed in certain instances by its far-reaching terms. However, the 
communications fraud statute applies directly to none of these judicially established 
categories of content-based regulation. 
It is also apparent from the statutory language that the legislature was not 
seeking to proscribe obscenity, incitement, or even defamation, by enactment of the 
communications fraud statute. The closest application to a judicially established 
constitutional standard for a content-based regulation is the category of unprotected 
speech that involves grave and imminent danger. However, §76-10-1801 substantially 
overreaches even here in that it is not necessary to prove any danger - grave or imminent 
- for criminal liability to be imposed. Hence, the unconstitutional overbreadth of the 
statute is manifest, and the State acknowledges and even embraces this legislative grant of 
unlimited prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Br. Rspdt at 13. 
Therefore, State's sole reliance upon the defamation element of mens rea 
(knowing, intentional, or reckless disregard for the truth), skews its analysis such that its 
conclusions are contrary to the fundamental First Amendment principles that must be 
protected in any content-based regulation. 
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When any statute proscribes communication based on content, as §76-10-1801 
does, a court must first determine whether it falls under a category of speech recognized 
as unprotected by established First Amendment jurisprudence, such as obscenity, child 
pornography, libel, incitement to riot, or grave and imminent danger. If it does, then a 
court must determine whether the statute in question is sufficiently narrow to promote a 
compelling government interest without infringing upon protected speech. 
The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is not 
only an aspect of individual liberty — and thus a good unto itself — but also is 
essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole. 
Under our Constitution "there is no such thing as a false idea. However 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." [citing 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340]. Nevertheless, there are 
categories of communication and certain special utterances to which the majestic 
protection of the First Amendment does not extend because they "are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." [citing Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572 (1942)]. 
Libelous speech has been held to constitute one such category, see Beauharnais 
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); others that have been held to be outside the 
scope of the freedom of speech are fighting words, Chaplinslvy v. New 
Hampshire, supra, incitement to riot, [citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969)], obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and child 
pornography, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). In each of these areas, 
the limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unprotected character of 
particular communications, have been determined by the judicial evaluation of 
special facts that have been deemed to have constitutional significance. In such 
cases, the Court has regularly conducted an independent review of the record 
both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected 
category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within 
acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not 
be inhibited. . . . The principle of viewpoint neutrality that underlies the First 
9 
Amendment itself, see Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
95-96 (1972), also imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is 
claimed that a particular communication is unprotected. See generally 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-505 (1984) (emphasis added). It is 
important to follow this narrowly prescribed course of constitutional review and to look 
to established precedent because, as the law cited above illustrates, what constitutes 
"unprotected speech" under the First Amendment represents the exception rather than the 
rule. Thus, the initial query should not be what is protected, but what is not. 
In answer to this initial question, there is no precedent supporting the State's 
conclusion that all falsehoods made with at least a reckless disregard for the truth are noi 
protected. In fact, although a false statement may have little if any social value, some 
falsehoods, as well as other communications also arguably having little if any social value 
(i.e. pornography, inane television programs, "'small talk," etc.), are protected in order to 
protect speech that matters. Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. at 341-42. Moreover, 
the State can demonstrate no compelling interest in proscribing all falsehoods made with 
the requisite intent. 
Nonetheless, the communications fraud statute breaches the slippery slope of 
endangering speech that matters because, as the State concedes, it prohibits all falsehoods 
made with the requisite intent, regardless of harm. In other words, it is a content-based 
regulation that is not narrowly draw to further a compelling government interest. 
Notwithstanding the fact that §76-10-1801 is not readily subject to a narrowing 
10 
construction, it is simply not prudent to enact a blanket ban on all at least recklessly made 
falsehoods. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court observed: 
Every communication has an individuality and "value" of its own. The 
suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of expression is, 
therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of things every such 
suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in which a reviewing 
court must determine for itself whether the attacked expression is [suppressive] 
within constitutional standards. Since those standards do not readily lend 
themselves to generalized definitions, the constitutional problem in the last 
analysis becomes one of particularized judgments which appellate courts must 
make for themselves. 
Id. at 497-498. Thus, a statute that casts a net large enough to criminalize both harmless 
and harmful speech, such as §76-10-1801 does, is not only unwise, it is unconstitutional 
because it is not narrowly drawn to further a compelling government interest. 
The fact that the State does not deny that §76-10-1801 proscribes even harmless 
falsehoods is problematic for the State. Br. Rspdt. at 13 ("It is therefore irrelevant how 
the statute limits the object of the fraud. Whether or not the object of the fraud is a kiss, a 
vote, avoiding arrest, or some other thing of arguable value is irrelevant because, in any 
case, the intentional, knowing, or reckless falsehood is not protected."). Indeed, the 
State's arguments manifest a clear understanding that the broad statutory language 
reaches just as broadly as the imagination - and as prosecutorial discretion - permits. Id. 
The State does not address this problem, or the fact that the statute leaves matters of basic 
policy indiscriminately to the subjective discretion of prosecutors, judges, juries, and 
policemen. Graynedv. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,108-9(1972). 
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Rather, the State simply argues that falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, 
or with a reckless disregard for the truth are not protected, while acknowledging United 
States Supreme Court precedent holding that the First Amendment must protect some 
falsehoods in order to protect speech that matters. Id (Citing Gertz v. Robert Welsh, 
Inc., 418 U.S. at 341-42). However, as demonstrated above, the fact that defamatory 
falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, are 
not protected {see, New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), does not justify the 
State's conclusion that all non-defamatory falsehoods made with a similar intent may be 
proscribed without offending the First Amendment. 
The State also ignores the restrictions articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court and set forth throughout Mr. Norris' opening brief relative to criminal statutes 
regulating communications.3 The also does not address the voluminous legal precedent 
developed over decades which holds criminal content-based regulations to a different 
standard than that which applies to actions for defamation. Nor does the State address the 
fact, outlined in detail in Mr. Norris5 opening brief, that §76-10-1801 deviates 
"See, e.g., BRIEF OF APPELLANT, at 17: "See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997) ("The increased deterrent effect of a vague criminal provision, coupled with the 
risk of discriminatory enforcement, poses greater concerns with respect to the freedom of 
speech protected by the Federal Constitution's First Amendment 1han those implicated by 
a civil regulation.");" BRIEF OF APPELLANT at 21: 'See also, Smith v United States, 431 
U.S. 291, 318 n.l6 (1977) (explaining that a criminal statute may not proscribe all 
potentially dangerous speech, without taking into account content ("Fire!") and place (a 
crowded theater) (citing and quoting Schenck))" 
12 
significantly from the common law and analogous statutes from other jurisdictions, 
particularly in that it proscribes harmless conduct. 
The broad language of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801, in harmony with the 
State's justifiably broad interpretation of it, imposes strict liability for any - at least 
recklessly made - false factual assertion. This is manifest in the fact that there need be no 
reliance, harm, or intent to defraud. This imposition of strict liability is more than merely 
problematic. It flies in the face of existing law. See, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (explaining that there is no strict liability for false factual assertions by 
a publisher because the contrary ''would have an undoubted 'chilling' effect on speech 
relating to public figures that does have constitutional value"; therefore, '"freedoms of 
expression require "breathing space'"" (quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 
475 U.S. 767, 772 (1985))). 
The communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face 
because it proscribes a substantial amount of protected speech, including harmless 
communications. Although the government has a compelling interest in preventing and 
prosecuting certain kinds of fraud, the statute is not narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 
And although §76-10-1801 could be construed in certain circumstances to prohibit speech 
that may involve grave and imminent danger, it just as readily applies to harmless 
communications posing no fraud or danger of any kind. Accordingly, the statute is 
facially invalid for overbreadth. 
13 
B. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF 
STANDING, AND IN ANY EVENT, MR. NORRIS HAS 
STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE FACIAL OVERBREADTH 
OF THE STATUTE. 
The State argues that Mr. Norris does not have standing to challenge the 
overbreadth of the communications fraud statute, citing this Court's decision in Provo 
City Corporation v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735 (Utah 2004). As an initial matter, the State is 
precluded from raising this issue as it exceeds the scope of certiorari. DeBry v. Noble, 
889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). This Court cannot review a question that was never raised and 
therefore never addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals, as such would clearly exceed the 
scope of certiorari. See, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (1995) (explaining that on 
a grant of certiorari, this Court reviews only the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals). 
Further, because the State has never alleged that Mr. Norris lacked standing to challenge 
the constitutionality of the statute, this issue is not preserved and is not properly before 
this Court. Therefore, this Court should refuse to address it. Smith v. Four Corners 
Mental Health Ctr., 70 P.3d 904 (Utah 2003). 
Even if the State could raise the issue of standing at this juncture, the State's 
argument is flawed in a number of respects. First, the Information by which Mr. Norris 
was charged expressly used the term, ''anything of value," as well as money. See, R8; 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Addendum A. Using broad language identical to the statute, Mr. 
Norris was charged with devising a "scheme or artifice to defraud subcontractors and 
others doing business with Bryce Nelson Construction or with its subcontractors, or to 
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obtain from them, money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and [with communicating] 
directly or indirectly with [the subcontractors], by any means for the purpose of executing 
or concealing the scheme or artifice. The total value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice was or exceeded $5,000.00." 
As also noted in his opening brief, because of the broad and vague language used in the 
charging document, which was based on the statute, Mr. Norris requested a bill of 
particulars which was denied (R182; 430). 
Second, Mr. Norris' position is and has consistently been that, not just the 
"anything of value" language, but the entire statute is unconstitutionally overbroad; and 
this Court cannot rewrite it to conform to constitutional standards. (" . . . the statute's 
unconstitutionality runs throughout its entire context, and cannot be remedied short of 
rewriting the entire provision." Id. at 19; ". . . §76-10-1801 casts such a large net for all 
possible offenders, regardless of intent, content, or place of proscribed speech, that it is 
effectively 'burning the house to roast the pig.'" (citation omitted); Id at 22; "The 
communications fraud statute, by its broad terms, is not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
legitimate government interest."). Id. 
Mr. Norris further highlights the broad language regarding the limitless 
possibilities for the object of the fraud (which the State concedes tol the lack of any 
requirement for reliance, the fact that the perpetrator need have no intent to permanently 
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deprive the owner of die object of the scheme or artifice to obtain anything of value, the 
confusing language of subsection 5 that makes each communication a separate offense in 
conjunction with subsections (1) a-e, and the broad definition of "communicate." Id. at 
23-24. All of these problems aside, the State simply misinterprets Thompson as it applies 
to the issue of standing here. 
The reason for the exception to traditional standing requirements in a facial 
overbreadth challenge "rests on the very real possibility that an overbroad statute will 
cause injury not only when applied to punish protected speech, but also in its 'chilling 
affect' on protected activity." Provo City Corporation v. Thompson, 86 P.3 at 739. Thus, 
even if Mr. Norris5 own conduct is not protected under the First Amendment, he has 
standing to challenge the statute if his alleged course of conduct was "arguably affected 
with a constitutional interest, proscribed by statute, and there exists a credible threat of 
prosecution." Id. Mr. Norris also must demonstrate that his harm will be redressed if the 
statute is invalidated. Id. 
The State misconstrues the law relative to the issue of standing and misinterprets 
Thompson. From the outset, a facial overbreadth challenge presents an exception to 
traditional standing requirements. Id. at 738. Further, Mr. Norris can demonstrate his 
own "cognizable injury in fact," even if his own conduct is not protected. Id. at 739. 
This requirement is satisfied because Mr. Norris participated "in a course of conduct 
arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute, and there exists 
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a credible threat of prosecution/' Id (quotation and citation omitted). Mr. Norris can also 
easily meet the second requirement for standing by showing that if this Court invalidates 
the statute, his harm will be redressed, as there can be no doubt that Mr. Norris has a 
"personal stake in the outcome of the controversy/* Id. (citing Bigelow v Virginia, 421 
U.S. 809,816-17(1975)). 
Moreover, in Thompson, this Court cited Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 
UT 26, P10, 73 P.3d 334, as authoritative in determining whether a party can demonstrate 
their own cognizable injury in fact in the context of a facial overbreadth challenge. In 
Haltom, this Court determined that because the selling of sexual devices is not speech, as 
such products express nothing, the party (Haltom) who challenged a statute adversely 
affecting his ability to engage in such conduct as facially overbroad under the First 
Amendment had no standing. Id. The selling of sexual devices was not a course of 
conduct affected with a constitutional interest under the First Amendment, and therefore, 
Haltom had no stake in the outcome of the controversy. 
This case is inapposite to Haltom. Here, the conduct at issue is speech for 
purposes of the First Amendment, and therefore, clearly fails under its protective 
provisions. Regardless of whether Mr. Norris' own conduct is or is not protected under 
the First Amendment, his alleged course of conduct (making a false communication) 
affected a constitutional interest, was proscribed by statute, and certainly posed a realized 
threat of prosecution. Furthermore, Mr. Norris obviously has a personal stake in the 
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outcome of this controversy. 
Based on the foregoing facts and law. Mr. Norris has standing to challenge Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-1801 for facial overbreadth, and the State's arguments are without 
merit. 
C A CHALLENGE TO A STATUTE'S OVERBREADTH 
ENCOMPASSES A CHALLENGE THAT THE STATUTE IS VOID 
FOR VAGUENESS. 
This Court expressly granted certiorari on the issue of overbreadth. It was not 
Mr, Norris' intent to exceed the scope of certiorari, and he does not believe he has done 
so. Because the concepts of overbreadth and vagueness are logically related and 
overlapping doctrines, Mr. Norris treated them as such in his opening brief See, BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT at 31 ("See, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983) ('We have 
traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar 
doctrines.'); see also, Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional 
Law §§20.9 at 274 (3 ed. 1999) ('The problem of vagueness in statutes regulating speech 
activities is based on the same rationale as the overbreadth doctrine and the Supreme 
Court often speaks of them together'). 
In short, the overly broad provisions of §76-10-1801 are so far-reaching in their 
scope, that they fail to define the offense such that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited, thereby encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 (Utah App. 1991). In other words, the overly 
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broad language makes the statute void for vagueness. As has already been argued herein, 
the statute provides virtually unlimited prosecutorial discretion in determining which 
conduct to prosecute and which cases to decline - in other words, it encourages arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. Unfettered prosecutorial discretion is the flaw inherent 
in any criminal statute that is overbroad, as well as a statute that is vague. 
Traditionally, the void for vagueness doctrine has focused upon the issue of 
notice - whether a statute defines an offense such "that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Ko lender v. Law son, 461 U.S. at 357-358. However, 
although the doctrines of overbreadth and void for vagueness may have some non-
substantive differences, the "more important" element of the void for vagueness doctrine 
is identical to that of the overbreadth doctrine: ". . . that a legislature establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement. . . . [thereby avoiding] a standardless sweep that 
allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. . . It 
would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all 
possible offenders . . . " Id. Thus, the overbreadth and void for vagueness doctrines are 
inseparably intertwined. 
Accordingly, Mr. Norris believes in good faith that this Court's grant of 
certiorari on the issue of overbreadth encompasses the issue of vagueness, and that this 
Court intends to consider both related doctrines relative to this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Appellant, Richard Morris, respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the Utah Court of Appeals and thereby vacate his 
convictions on the grounds that §76-10-1801 is unconstitutional on its face. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040880-SC 
BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is properly before this Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from its decision in State v. Norris, 2004 UT App. 267, 97 P.3d 732. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Does a statutory constitutional defect deprive the trial court of jurisdiction? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, adopting the same standard of review and reviewing questions of law 
for correctness and factual findings for clear error. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1199. 
Questions regarding the scope of judicial authority are questions of law. Beaver County 
v. Qwest, Inc., 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A guilty plea does not waive an appellant's right to challenge the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the trial court. By express provision in the Utah Code, a court does not 
have jurisdiction over a matter excepted by the State constitution or otherwise prohibited 
by law. If a criminal statute is unconstitutional, it is excepted by the constitution and 
prohibited by law. Because the communications fraud statute is unconstitutional on its 
face for overbreadth, it is prohibited by law and, therefore, the trial court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over this matter. 
Further, this Court has never directly addressed this issue before. However, a 
substantial body of federal precedent holds that a challenge to a statute's constitutionality 
is a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, and is therefore not 
waived by an unconditional guilty plea. 
If a person is convicted under an unconstitutional criminal provision, either by 
trial or plea, it is a violation of that person's right to due process of law. This is true 
because, under existing constitutional law. the government lacked the power from the 
outset to hale the person into court and answer the charges. Therefore, an 
unconstitutional statute deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A CHALLENGE TO A STATUTE'S CONSTITUTIONALITY IS 
JURISDICTIONAL IN NATURE. 
A guilty plea does not waive an appellant's right to challenge his convictions on 
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grounds alleging jurisdictional defects. United States v. Harper, 901 F.2d 471, 472 (5th 
Cir. 1990); see also, United States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(explaining that a guilty plea is no bar to a challenge on jurisdictional grounds). 
Moreover, federal courts have determined that a statute's unconstitutional vagueness is a 
jurisdictional defect. United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 
Blacldedge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (holding that a defendant can challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute after entering a guilty plea)). 
If a statute under which a defendant is charged is unconstitutionally overbroad, it 
follows that the Information may not even charge a crime or is constitutionally defective. 
United States v„ Harper, 901 F.2d at 473 ("A criminal indictment 'must be a plain, 
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged.'"(emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Morales-Rosales, 838 F.2d 
1359, 1361 (5th Cir. 1988)). "An [Information] that fails to allege each material element 
of an offense fails to charge that offense." Id. But see, United States v. Allen, 24 F.3d 
1180, 1183 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a defendant who makes a counseled and 
voluntary guilty plea admits both the acts described in the indictment and the legal 
consequences of those acts, and therefore any challenges on appeal are foreclosed by 
admissions made during the plea colloquy). 
In this case, Mr. Norris challenges the constitutionality of the communications 
fraud statute and thus the sufficiency of the Information filed against him, both of which 
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have been determined by federal courts to be non-waivable jurisdictional issues as 
referenced in the cases cited above. Moreover, if a statute cannot pass constitutional 
scrutiny, it follows that a trial court has no subject matter jurisdiction over any charge 
brought under that statute. Accordingly, Mr. Norris may appeal his convictions in this 
case notwithstanding his guilty pleas. 
Further, Mr. Norris did not waive his right to appeal the statute's 
constitutionality and thus the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court when he did not 
file a motion to withdraw his pleas. To preserve for appeal the challenge to a trial court's 
compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appellant must first 
file a motion to withdraw his plea within 30 days after sentencing. State v. Reyes, 40 P.3d 
630 (Utah 2002). However, in this case, the issue before this Court is not the trial court's 
compliance with Rule 11 but the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute, 
and thus the sufficiency of the Information apprising Mr. Norris of the charges, which 
issues are direct challenges to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. 
Accordingly, Mr. Norris may appeal his convictions on the grounds that §76-10-1801 is 
unconstitutional and therefore the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
The State claims that Mr. Norris waived his right to appeal the constitutionality 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 when he pleaded guilty in this case. The State further 
cites State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) which provides that a defendant who 
pleads guilty "waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre~plea 
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constitutional violations." Id. at 1278 (emphasis added). The State also concedes that a 
defendant is not precluded from challenging the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
Not only is the State's position flawed, but it is inconsistent with the very authority it 
cites. 
Although it does not appear that this issue has been directly addressed in Utah 
appellate courts, the rationale underlying the wise and widely adopted principle that an 
unconstitutional law deprives a court of jurisdiction is supported by Utah Code Ann. §78-
3-4(1), which bestows jurisdiction upon the district courts "in all matters . . . not excepted 
in the [state] Constitution and not prohibited by law" (emphasis added). A statute that is 
unconstitutional is, by definition, excepted by the Constitution and prohibited by law, and 
therefore, raises a valid challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts. 
The issue is not, as the State argues, dependant on the fact that criminal statutes 
are presumed constitutional from the outset. If the legislature unwisely makes it a crime 
to yell "Fire!" in all circumstances, a person who violates the statute and consequently 
saves many lives by doing so may plead guilty to the offense, because in fact he is guilty. 
However, just because the unwise and facially invalid criminal provision is presumed 
constitutional from the outset does not mean the conviction should stand, or that the 
defendant should be precluded from challenging his conviction. Nor would an outcome 
favorable to Mr. Norris in this case require district courts to sua sponte consider the 
constitutionality of every criminal statute under which charges are brought. There is also 
25 
no justification for the claim that criminal matters would remain perpetually unresolved. 
Rather, the issue is simply whether a challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute is jurisdictional in nature. Logic compels the conclusion that it is. Therefore, it 
cannot be waived by a guilty plea. A claim that a law is invalid challenges the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the trial court because such a claim asserts, "The State had no power 
to charge me with this crime because the statute upon which the State relies violates 
constitutional law. Therefore, the State had no power to hale me into court and force me 
to answer to these charges." If a statute violates constitutional law, the claim of 
unconstitutionality is valid regardless of when it is raised. 
Federal courts have adopted this position, and have further clarified identical 
principles already adopted and relied upon, if not yet fully addressed, by this Court. 
Using language strikingly similar to that set forth in Parsons above, the Ninth Circuit 
Court clarified the distinction between "pre-plea constitutional violations" and 
"jurisdictional claims": "Although a guilty plea generally waives all claims of 
constitutional violation occurring before the plea, 'jurisdictional' claims are an exception 
to this rule," United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United 
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1989), amended at 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
Moreover, "claims that the applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment 
fails to state an offense are jurisdictional claims not waived by the guilty plea." United 
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d at 552 (quoting United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 
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1261 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1979). cert denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979)). Thus, a guilty plea waives 
pre-plea constitutional non-jurisdictional violations, such as an unlawful search and 
seizure, but not constitutional claims that by their nature, divest the trial court of 
jurisdiction over the matter. 
Several other courts have consistently followed this same sound reasoning, and 
in many of these cases, the United States Supreme Court declined to review. See, United 
States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989); 
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314 (6th Cir. 1994); O'Learyv. United States, 856 F.2d 
1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 
1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980). Mr. Norris urges this Court to follow this 
precedent and hold that a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a challenge to 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. 
The State argues that this Court's decision in Myers v. State, 94 P.3d 211 (Utah 
2004), defeats the Utah Court of Appeals holding that a constitutional defect divests the 
trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the State's interpretation of Myers is 
inaccurate. In Myers, after determining that the defendant's claims were procedurally 
barred, this Court briefly addressed Myers' then moot claim that the trial court's 
conclusion that a fetus is a "person" in the context of the aggravated murder statute was 
unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Myers contended that a fetus 
could not be construed as a "person" in the context of the aggravated murder statute 
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without violating Roe v Wade. This Court responded: 
wTn considering Myers's motion, the trial court determined that a fetus was a 
'person' for purposes of the aggravated murder statute, and, therefore, the State 
appropriately prosecuted Myers under that statute. 'A judgment is not void 
merely because it is erroneous,9 and '[a] judgment incorrectly interpreting a rule 
of law does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
proceeding.' (quoting In re Estate of McLaughlin, ISA P.2d 679, 682 (Utah 
App. 1988)). At most, Myers is claiming that the trial court's decision 
constituted an 'erroneous application of the law" See id. To hold that a court is 
divested of subject matter jurisdiction because of an allegedly incorrect legal 
interpretation borders on the nonsensical and would allow a substantial 
circumvention of the present framework with respect to post-conviction claims." 
Myers v. State, 94 P.3d at 215-16 (emphasis added). Therefore, this Court did not directly 
address the question of whether a statute's unconstitutionality deprives a trial court of 
jurisdiction. 
As Judge Orme noted in his concurring opinion in Norris, this "Court's 
dismissal of the jurisdictional argument in Myers was premised on the simplistic notion 
that c[a] court has subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the 
court has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court 
derives its authority.' . . . The Myers opinion did not acknowledge, much less did it treat, 
the extensive state and federal jurisprudence categorizing the facial unconstitutionality of 
a criminal statute as being a matter of subject matter jurisdiction - a virtual impossibility 
if the argument had actually been made and was well-supported, as in the instant case." 
State v. Norris, 97 P.3d at n2(citation omitted). 
In contrast to Myers, Mr. Norris is not arguing that the trial court erroneously 
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applied the law. He is arguing that the underlying statute is unconstitutional. And if the 
statute is unconstitutional it is by definition, excepted by the State and federal 
constitutions and, therefore, prohibited by law. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3-4(1). 
The State criticizes the Utah Court of Appeals' reliance on Blackledge v. Perry, 
417 U.S. 21 (1974), and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), arguing that these cases 
do no support the court's holding that an unconstitutional statute is a jurisdictional defect. 
However, both of those cases directly support Mr. Norris' position, as they stand for the 
proposition that a constitutional defect deprives the State of the power to bring charges 
against a defendant from the outset. Logically, this is true whether the constitutional 
defect is a due process violation, double jeopardy, or an overly broad statute. As all are 
constitutional violations, it does not matter which provision of the constitution is violated. 
Moreover, the Due Process Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the 
federal constitution proves problematic when the government obtains a conviction under 
an unconstitutional statute, or via the unconstitutional application of a statute. The 
practical effect of the Due Process Clause in such a circumstance is to simply deprive the 
trial court of jurisdiction from the outset and invalidate the conviction. 
For example, in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), a defendant residing in 
North Carolina pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and was then subsequently convicted by 
a jury of a felony offense for the same conduct, in violation of prohibitions against double 
jeopardy. The high court stated that because of the constitutional violations inherent in 
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the second prosecution, "the very initiation of the proceedings against [the defendant] . . . 
thus operated to deny him due process of law. . . . The 'practical result' dictated by the 
Due Process Clause in this case is that North Carolina simply could not require Perry [the 
defendant] to answer to the felony charge." Id. at 30-31. 
The ultimate result in Blackledge v. Perry would have been no different if Perry 
had pleaded guilty to the charges in the second prosecution, because the constitutional 
violations, and thus the due process deprivations, are identical in both circumstances. In 
either scenario, the district court ultimately lacked jurisdiction over the unconstitutional 
prosecution and conviction of the second case. Yet if the State's arguments in this case 
were adopted, a defendant who pleaded guilty twice to the same offense would be 
precluded from challenging the second conviction under the procedural facts of this case. 
The State urges this Court to follow the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. 
Thomas, 685 N.W.2d 69 (Neb. 2004). It is noteworthy that this is one of only two cases4 
(to counsel's best knowledge) directly contraiy to Mr. Norris' position and the substantial 
federal precedent cited above. Notwithstanding that the Nebraska court, while acknow-
4The State also references United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert 
denied, 519 U.S. 879 (1996), wherein that court also rejected arguments that a facial 
constitutional challenge to a presumptively valid statute divests a court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. However, while again acknowledging precedent on both sides of this issue, 
and further declining to hold that federal appellate courts may not ever consider 
constitutional challenges raised for the first time on appeal, it also noted as persuasive the 
fact that the statute at issue in that case did not involve the state's power to hale a 
defendant into court, but rather merely involved the increase of a penalty. Id. at 542-43. 
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ledging precedent on both sides of the issue, appears to be in the minority, the appellant in 
that case was seeking at least a second bite of the proverbial apple. Thomas raised, for 
the first time, his claim that the statute's alleged unconstitutionality deprived the trial 
court of subject matter jurisdiction on his second appeal after remand. In this posture, the 
appellate court determined that Thomas' claim that the charging statute was unconstitu-
tional did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and that he waived it by 
failing to preserve the issue via a motion to quash in the district court. Id at 84. 
In sum, a challenge to a statute's constitutionality is jurisdictional in nature and 
is, therefore, not waived by a guilty plea. Accordingly, Mr. Norris's guilty pleas in this 
case do not preclude him from raising his constitutional challenges on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr Norris respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals that a challenge to the facial overbreadth of a 
statute is jurisdictional in nature, and is therefore not waived by a guilty plea. 
Respectfully submitted this
 x ^
Lli
 day of June, 2005. 
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